History of the World/History of the World (Bureau Development, Inc.)(1992).BIN/dp/0122/01227.txt

Text File | 1992-10-11 | 10KB | 173 lines

$Unique_ID{how01227}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Federalist Or The New Constitution, The
Number I. General Introduction}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Hamilton, Alexander;Madison, James;Jay, John}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{government
constitution
new
union
state
upon
appearance
liberty
truth
}
$Date{1787-1788}
$Log{}
Title:       Federalist Or The New Constitution, The
Author:      Hamilton, Alexander;Madison, James;Jay, John
Date:        1787-1788

Number I. General Introduction

To the People of the State of New York:

     After an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting
federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution
for the United States of America.  The subject speaks its own importance;
comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the
Union, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate
of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world.  It has been
frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this
country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question,
whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined
to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.  If there
be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with
propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a
wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be
considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

     This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of
patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men
must feel for the event.  Happy will it be if our choice should be directed
by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by
considerations not connected with the public good.  But this is a thing more
ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected.  The plan offered to our
deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many
local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects
foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable
to the discovery of truth.

     Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution
will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a
certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a
diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold
under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class
of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of
their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation
from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than
from its union under one government.

     It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature.
I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the
opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject
them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views.  Candor will oblige us
to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it
cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance,
or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at
least, if not respectable - the honest errors of minds led astray by
preconceived jealousies and fears.  So numerous indeed and so powerful are
the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon
many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right
side of questions of the first magnitude to society.  This circumstance, if
duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever
so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy.  And a
further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the
reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are
influenced by purer principles than their antagonists.  Ambition, avarice,
personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more
laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as
those who oppose the right side of a question.  Were there not even
inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that
intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political parties.
For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making
proselytes by fire and sword.  Heresies in either can rarely be cured by
persecution.

     And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have
already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former
cases of great national discussion.  A torrent of angry and malignant
passions will be let loose.  To judge from the conduct of the opposite
parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince
the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts
by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives.
An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be
stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile
to the principles of liberty.  An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the
rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of
the heart, will be represented as mere pretence and artifice, the stale bait
for popularity at the expense of the public good.  It will be forgotten, on
the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the
noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and
illiberal distrust.  On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the
vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the
contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never
be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the
specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidding
appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government.  History
will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the
introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have
overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their
career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues,
and ending tyrants.

     In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my
fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from
whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment
to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from
the evidence of truth.  You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected
from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not
unfriendly to the new Constitution.  Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that,
after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it
is your interest to adopt it.  I am convinced that this is the safest course
for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness.  I affect not reserves
which I do not feel.  I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation
when I have decided.  I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will
freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded.  The
consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity.  I shall not, however,
multiply professions on this head.  My motives must remain in the depository
of my own breast.  My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by
all.  They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the
cause of truth.

     I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting
particulars: - The utility of the Union to your political prosperity - The
insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve that Union - The
necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one proposed,
to the attainment of this object - The conformity of the proposed
Constitution to the true principles of republican government - Its analogy to
your own State constitution - and lastly, The additional security which its
adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of government, to
liberty, and to property.

     In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a
satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their
appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

     It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the
utility of the Union, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the
great body of the people in every State, and one which, it may be imagined,
has no adversaries.  But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in
the private circles of those who oppose the New constitution, that the
thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we
must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of
the whole. ^*  This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually
propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it.
For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged
view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new
Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union.  It will therefore be of use to
begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the
probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution.
This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.

[Footnote *: The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is
held out in several of the late publications against the new
Constitution. - Publius]

Publius